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Abstract9
As a significant emitter of greenhouse gases and a country rich in fossil fuels,
Russia plays a crucial role in achieving a comprehensive solution to climate-
related challenges. Yet, Russia’s official position on climate change has varied
considerably since the beginning of global negotiations, with the country playing
everything from policy leader to laggard. While there are a number factors that
shape domestic policy positions on climate change, this study offers a compre-
hensive investigation of newspaper coverage on climate change in Russia. How
have Russian newspapers discussed the issue since the Yeltsin era? We approach
this question by compiling the largest data set of Russian newspaper coverage
to date, which includes 11,131 climate-related articles from 65 papers over a
roughly 35 year period. After introducing a “computer assisted” approach to
measure the core themes running through climate change coverage, we statis-
tically evaluate the national- and newspaper-level factors associated with how
coverage is framed, focusing attention on 23 high circulation papers over the
period from 2000 to 2014. We find that national-level predictors—particularly
economic conditions—are highly influential of whether climate change is covered
and how the issue is framed, while paper-level factors such as the presence of
energy interest and ownership structure also have notable effects. Overall, this
study offers a rich data set and an array of methods to better understand the
drivers of climate communication in Russia.
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1. Introduction11
As the world’s fourth largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter, Russia remains a12
vital piece of any comprehensive and effective plan to mitigate the harmful effects13
of climate change (UNFCCC 2014). Although Russia played an ambiguous14
but, nevertheless, pivotal role in the Kyoto Protocol’s acceptance (Afionis and15
Chatzopoulos 2010, Andonova 2008), its current commitment to reducing GHG16
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emissions remains unclear. Recently, Russia announced its withdrawal from the18
second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol (Bedritsky 2014), eliminated19
expenses on energy efficiency from the 2015 federal budget (Davydova 2015),20
and released a set of “intended nationally determined contributions” (INDCs)21
that could increase GHG emissions considerably above current levels by 203022
(Levin and Damassa 2015). It is thus an open question as to whether Russia23
will be a leader or laggard in the pursuit to negotiate and implement an effective24
solution to challenges posed by anthropogenic global warming.25
Understanding Russia’s position on climate change policy requires careful26
consideration of the international and domestic factors that promote or impede27
cooperation. While a diverse array of factors have been suggested in the lit-28
erature, media coverage is seen to play a crucial role in various aspects of the29
climate debate. First, considering the agenda-setting function of mass media30
(McCombs and Shaw 1972) and its influence in shaping public opinion in Russia31
(White and Oates 2003), news coverage offers a useful means to discern domestic32
support for climate change action. Discerning public opinion is crucial, as only33
roughly 3 in 10 Russians believe that climate change is a serious problem and34
overall concern has decreased by roughly 10% since 2010 (Stokes et al. 2015).35
Second, mass media also play an important role in translating state views of36
climate change to national and international audiences, particularly in nations37
with limited press freedom (Bell 1994, Boyce and Lewis 2009, Boykoff 2012,38
Butler and Pidgeon 2009, Davidsen and Graham 2014, Dirikx and Gelders 2009,39
Doulton and Brown 2009, Grundmann and Scott 2012, Lockwood 2009, Lyy-40
tima¨ki 2011). Having a long history of close relations with the state, Russian41
media coverage often serves as a window into official government positions on42
climate policy and thus inform interested parties on how to understand Russia’s43
position at future climate change negotiations (Poberezhskaya 2015).44
Against this backdrop, we examine the evolution of Russian media discourse45
on global warming in the post-Soviet era. Although a number of studies ex-46
amine climate change-related communication in Russia (Poberezhskaya 2014;47
Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010), past work is limited both48
in terms of time period under study and the number of media outlets examined.49
We contribute to the literature by 1) compiling the largest corpus of Russian50
newspaper coverage on the issue of climate change, collecting 11,131 relevant51
articles from 65 newspapers over the time period from May, 1980 to May, 2014;52
2) introduce a computer assisted approach to content analysis appropriate for53
a large corpus of documents; and 3) offer a multi-level statistical framework for54
assessing the drivers of media coverage in Russia. To our knowledge, this study55
offers the first large-scale analysis of Russian print media coverage of climate56
change that statistically evaluates how both paper and national level charac-57
teristics shape climate discourse. Overall, the evidence suggests that economic58
conditions are more likely than political factors to explain climate coverage,59
while paper-specific characteristics—such as energy interests, ownership struc-60
ture, and ideology—also play a role. Our study thus questions arguments on61
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the predominant influence of political personalities over climate discourse in the62
country and suggests a range of alternative explanations for the media approach63
to the problem.64
2. Media Coverage of Climate Change in Russia: Theory and Hy-65
potheses66
The importance of mass media in communicating climate change risks has67
been stressed by a variety of scholars (Bell 1994; Boyce and Lewis 2009; Boykoff68
2012; Butler and Pidgeon 2009; Carvalho and Burgess 2005; Davidsen and Gra-69
ham 2014; Dirikx and Gelders 2009; Doulton and Brown 2009; Grundmann and70
Scott 2012; Lockwood 2009; Lyytima¨ki 2011; Olausson 2009). Often the first71
point of contact between public and climate science, the media is tasked with the72
crucial role of interpreting the somewhat abstract and difficult to comprehend73
scientific discourse (Beck 1992; Boykoff and Boykoff 2007; Carvalho 2007; Nelkin74
1987 ; Rapley and De Meyer 2014). Olausson and Berglez (2014 p. 251) suggest75
that scholarly investigations of media coverage of climate change issues should76
expand inquiries of the power dynamics within national media discourses: “it77
is vital to examine who becomes the ‘primary definer’ of the climate issues.” In78
other words, it is crucial to identify the role of mass media in “setting the agenda”79
(Newell 2006; Boykoff and Boykoff 2004; Carvalho and Burgess 2005) and “fram-80
ing” the debate around the policy and science of global warming (Boykoff 2007a,81
Boykoff and Rajan 2007, Carvalho 2007).82
The media’s ability to define the issue of climate change does not take place83
in a vacuum—mass media both shapes and is shaped by social, political, and84
economic forces. Bailey et al. (2014 p. 199) note, in their comparative study of85
Spanish and American media coverage of climate change, that “media portrayals86
of climate (un)certainty are steeped in the historically contingent space of ideol-87
ogy, culture, and politics, where various actors and institutions battle to shape88
public understanding and engagement.” When studying the Russian case, one89
observes a historical progression marked by an ambiguous relationship between90
the media, the state, and key economic actors. Towards the end of the 1980s and91
in the early 1990s, the media became an influential actor in the regime change92
process through its increasingly open criticism of the old regime and growing93
support of emerging political actors (Coyne and Leeson 2009, Mickiewicz 1999,94
Strovskiy 2011, Voltmer 2000). During the presidency of Boris Yeltsin, the mass95
media’s political role swung from that of active support for the ruling elite to ex-96
treme criticism of some of its more questionable political decisions (for example,97
the war in Chechnya, see Grabel’nikov 2001). Furthermore, Yeltsin’s presidency98
was marked by the growth in power of the so-called “oligarchs” and their ex-99
panding control over the media market (Lipman and McFaul 2001; Zassoursky100
2001). The dawn of the Putin era in Russian politics further signified a move101
towards the centralisation of the media market and the re-establishment of state102
authority in the public discourse (Becker 2004; Zassoursky 2004). Moreover,103
when studying media coverage of climate change, it is important to consider104
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that “oligarchs” and the state have close connections to the Russian fossil fuel105
industry, with such “gas giants” as Gazprom owning a vast number of national106
media outlets (Toepfl 2013). As will be discussed below, the interests of such107
owners are expected to shape newspaper coverage of climate change.108
2.1. Presidency and Kremlin loyalty109
Richard Sakwa (2010: viii) argues that Russia is “a dual state” where “the110
legal-normative system based on constitutional order is challenged by shadowy111
arbitrary arrangements.” For example, it can be argued that power in the coun-112
try is disproportionately skewed towards the president or towards key political113
figures (for example, Putin’s personal domination over Russian politics (Hanson114
2010)). Regarding Russia’s climate policy, it has been suggested that stagna-115
tion in its development can be explained by Putin’s personal negative attitude116
towards this environmental problem (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). At the same117
time, the recent positive change in national climate affairs could be attributed to118
Medvedev’s striving for a green economy and modernisation (Monaghan 2012).119
Therefore, we suggest that while pro-Kremlin newspapers are expected to closely120
follow the state’s agenda on climate change, their coverage will adjust depending121
on whether Putin or Medvedev is in power. Where Putin’s presidency would122
have a negative impact on the quantity of articles and qualitatively on their con-123
tent, the discussion will steer away from the sensitive issues of domestic politics124
and emphasize the costs of climate action. Under Medvedev’s leadership, we125
expect to see an increase in coverage with more discussions dedicated to energy126
efficiency, international cooperation, domestic politics as well as science.127
2.2. Newspaper ownership, interests and ideology128
As Andonova (2008) argues, we cannot oversimplify Russia’s political pro-129
cess by narrowing it down to the changes at the executive level. Therefore, we130
need to consider a range of other societal and newspaper-level variables that131
may determine newspaper attention to climate change. By examining the UK132
quality press, (Carvalho 2007 p. 223) discusses how the media representation133
of climate change, “is strongly entangled with ideological standpoints.” In Rus-134
sia, the ideological orientation of the newspapers has to be treated with caution135
as the distinction between left, centre and right are often blurred and need to136
be treated in consideration with media ownership structures and their govern-137
mental links. That said, as demonstrated by previous research on the influence138
of the newspapers’ political leanings on their approach to climate change cov-139
erage (Carvalho and Burgess 2005, Carvalho 2007, Poberezhskaya 2015), we140
can suggest that oppositional newspapers (far-right and far-left) owned by non-141
governmental political parties will be very vocal across various topics as they can142
use climate change as an opportunity to criticise the state. Similar expectations143
(but to a lesser degree) could be expected from the newspapers whose majority144
shareholders are journalists, especially those on the political left. At the same145
time, the media outlets belonging to the political right and centre should be146
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quite reserved in their climate coverage and likely eschew economically prob-147
lematic areas (e.g. Russia’s international obligations or fossil fuel industry). We148
expect that avoidance will also be intensified if a newspaper is owned by business149
interests or if it state-owned. At the same time, considering the nature of the cli-150
mate change problem, we hypothesise that newspapers with energy interests will151
avoid discussing the problem in the context of fossil fuels or renewable energy152
development, and should also be less likely to discuss climate change overall.153
It should be noted that, throughout the studied years, the Russian newspapers’154
market has been dominated by the business led ownership structure with various155
degrees of their relations with the state (Lehtisaari 2015).156
2.3. National economic performance157
It has been argued that during economic recessions people tend to privi-158
lege financial stability over environmental security (e.g. Inglehart 1995, Scruggs159
and Benegal 2012, Shum 2012). For decades this has been the case for Russia160
where the environment has been persistently sacrificed to economic develop-161
ment (Henry 2010). Therefore, we can assume that economic crises (e.g. high162
inflation) should reduce newspaper attention to climate change, as the national163
economic well-being would take precedence. However, the state of the economy164
might also have an impact on what themes are focused on when climate change165
is indeed discussed. We posit that poor economic performance should be pos-166
itively associated with discussion of climate change in the context of economic167
opportunities (e.g. Arctic development, international cooperation and energy168
efficiency).169
2.4. Natural disasters170
There is some (but limited) evidence in the literature linking the influence171
of extreme weather events to media coverage of climate change (Shanahan and172
Good 2000, Boykoff and Boykoff 2007, Boykoff 2007b, Scha¨fer et al. 2014). How-173
ever, impacts of natural hazards on attention to global warming seem to also174
depend on various social, political, economic, and other country-specific factors.175
Current understanding suggests heterogeneous effects, with cross-national vari-176
ation in the intensity of the negative consequences of climate change on public177
discourse (e.g. Scha¨fer et al. 2014, Schmidt et al. 2013). However, there is evi-178
dence which indicates that warm temperature anomalies might impact individual179
attitudes toward climate change (Li et al. 2011, Zaval et al. 2014). Considering180
Russia’s growing climate vulnerability, we suggest that climate change related181
natural hazards should increase media attention to global warming. The 2010182
Russian heatwave, which resulted in the deaths of over 55,000 people and an es-183
timated economic loss of $15 billion (Barriopedro et al. 2011), was a catastrophic184
event that led to a strengthening of ecological groups in Russia (Yanitsky 2012).185
We therefore expect that when natural disasters occur, newspaper coverage of186
climate change should be more likely.187
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3. Measuring Russian Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change, 2000-188
2014189
This study extends previous work on media coverage of climate change in190
Russia by incorporating an extensive list of Russian newspapers over a consid-191
erable period of time. To create the corpus, we retrieved newspaper articles192
which contained the terms “climate change”, “global warming”, or “greenhouse193
effect” from the Eastview Russian Central Newspapers database (UDB-COM).194
This resulted in the identification of 11,131 relevant articles from 65 newspa-195
pers. The temporal coverage of the corpus is large, ranging from 3 May 1980196
to 7 May 2014. The full list of newspapers and article counts, along with an197
illustration of temporal variation in coverage for the entire period are presented198
in Appendix A.1. Most newspapers entered the Eastview database in the late199
1990s and early 2000s. Estimates of attention to climate change by the Russian200
press are therefore reliable starting around 2000. It is for this reason that the201
analysis conducted in Section 4 relies on 6,527 articles from the 23 most circu-202
lated newspapers over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014. Specifically, we focus the203
study on a sample of papers with moderate to high circulation counts, ranging204
from 85,000 (the social-political weekly magazine Itogi) to a maximum observed205
count of 2,985,000 (the national popular weekly Argumenty i fakty). We expect206
that newspapers with very large circulation figures are influential due to massive207
exposure and that newspapers with average circulations are likely to have more208
narrow audiences. However, these somewhat smaller papers (e.g. Kommersant)209
are also likely to be influential since they are more likely to target “elites” and210
opinion leaders.211
It is also important to note the potential limitations associated with focusing212
on newspapers to measure media coverage. As in many other countries around213
the world, the majority of Russians get their news from television, with over 90%214
of Russians tuning in each week (Broadcasting Board of Governors 2014, Deloitte215
CIS Research Centre 2016). Moreover, consistent with international trends in216
media consumption, the importance of online news has increased steadily over-217
time, particularly among younger individuals and those living in urban areas218
(Ibid). At the same time, print media remains an important source of news in219
general and political news in particular, with over 50% turing to newspapers220
and magazines for their news each week (Deloitte CIS Research Centre 2016).221
Figure 1 displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the222
23 most circulated Russian newspapers. Several features of aggregate media223
coverage based on the corpus are worth noting. Coverage of climate change in224
the Russian press maintained a steady increase until 2007, when we can observe a225
significant spike in attention. This finding is somewhat unexpected, as existing226
literature on Russian media coverage of climate change focuses on the period227
around 2009; prior years such as 2007 have been relatively ignored. Following a228
brief drop in coverage after 2007, there is a renewed spike in attention over the229
2009-2010 period (Copenhagen meeting and 2010 Russian heat wave), which is230
then followed by a steady decrease in coverage. This attention pattern, more or231
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Figure 1: The number of newspaper articles that mention climate change over time.
Displays quarterly counts of climate change related articles for the US “prestige press”
(Washington Post, Wall Street Journal, New York Times, USA Today and Los Angeles
Times) [black], the New York Times [grey], and the 23 most prominent Russian news-
papers based on circulation [orange]. US newspaper data are derived from Boykoff
et al. (2015). See Appendix C.1 for a detailed list of the most prominent Russian
newspapers.
less, maps well with coverage rates from major American newspapers (Boykoff232
et al. 2015). However, as is clear from the plot, in terms of absolute coverage,233
Russian newspapers have devoted strikingly low attention to the issue when234
compared to the American press. Notably, the New York Times has published235
more climate change related articles than all prominent Russian papers combined236
for most of the 2000-2014 period.237
3.1. Measuring climate-related themes: computer “assisted” content analysis238
While aggregate trends offer some insight into climate-related coverage, the239
obvious next question centers on what themes are prevalent in Russian newspa-240
pers. Past content analyses of climate change coverage rely almost exclusively241
on traditional methods based on human coders (Antilla 2008, Bailey et al. 2014,242
Olausson 2009, Shrestha et al. 2014, Taylor and Nathan 2002). These meth-243
ods are, however, extremely costly—in terms of both time and effort—and thus244
researchers are often forced to make important trade-offs, either constraining245
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temporal coverage (c.f., Nissani 1999, Painter and Ashe 2012) or focusing on246
thoroughly reading a smaller, more manageable set of documents (c.f., Elsasser247
and Dunlap (2013), Dunlap and Jacques (2013)).248
Yet, if traditional content analytic methods do not scale to meet the needs249
of scholars of climate communication, it is essential to identify approaches that250
do. More recently, scholars have examined the “promise and pitfalls” of au-251
tomated classification methods across a range of common tasks in the social252
sciences (Grimmer and Stewart 2013), and for classifying news story content in253
particular (Ali et al. 2010, Young and Soroka 2012). The promise of computa-254
tional methods is clear: they offer a reliable means to classify the primary topics255
or themes for large corpora of text (Mikhaylov et al. 2012). The drawback of256
computational methods, however, is that considerable effort must go into ensur-257
ing model validity (Quinn et al. 2010). In short, important trade-offs must be258
considered irrespective of whether an analyst chooses to employ traditional or259
automated forms of content analysis.260
We argue that much may be gained by combining aspects of both method-261
ologies. Consistent with recent literature on the use of text analytic models262
in the social sciences, our approach views computational methods as assisting,263
not replacing, traditional techniques (Grimmer and King 2011). Grimmer and264
Stewart (2013 p. 2) summarize this position quite well:265
“the complexity of language implies that automated content analysis266
methods will never replace careful and close reading of texts. Rather,267
the methods that we profile here are best thought of as amplifying268
and augmenting careful reading and thoughtful analysis.” (emphasis269
in original)270
As such, we analyze key themes in climate-related articles using an approach271
that strikes a balance between traditional methods based on human coding and272
recent advances in the field of natural language processing. Specifically, we273
employ the following three-step procedure:274
1. we first “augment” the corpus using an unsupervised algorithm to iden-275
tify meaningful topics (or clusters) in Russian newspapers and utilize the276
estimated topics to identify a small subset of documents that require a277
“careful and close reading;”278
2. use the results of step 1 and traditional inductive content analytic methods279
to code a sample of documents into a set of valid, reliable, and substantively280
meaningful themes;281
3. combine the results from steps 1 and 2 to develop a computational proce-282
dure for classifying the primary themes in the corpus, validating the model283
using common classification performance metrics (i.e., accuracy, precision,284
and recall).285
The remainder of this section briefly outlines our approach—a fuller description286
of all of the methods described in this section is available in the online appendix.287
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3.1.1. Reducing dimensionality via unsupervised learning288
We begin with the observation that while reading 11,131 articles is practically289
infeasible, carefully assessing 100 key “topics” is much more attainable. As290
a first step, then, we need a method to reduce our overall corpus to a core291
set of topics or themes. To achieve this objective, we utilize the well-known292
latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model originally proposed in Blei et al. (2003).293
Viewing each document as a finite mixture of “topics” (i.e. meaningful clusters294
of words), the LDA models the random process responsible for “generating” a295
particular text (see the supplemental appendix for technical details). While the296
Bayesian methods used to produce “topics” are a bit involved (see the appendix297
for details), the important point is that the LDA has been shown to preform298
well in a wide range of areas, from population biology to information retrieval,299
and thus provides a suitable method our data reduction task (Blei 2012 see).300
The results from estimating a 100 topic model are available in the appendix301
(see Table B.4). Analyzing all 100 topics, however, is unwieldy and many top-302
ics deal with similar overarching themes. As such, there are substantive and303
practical benefits from further coding the topics into higher order themes that304
conform with key aspects of climate change coverage. To do this, we first cate-305
gorize topics into topic families or “meta-topics” using the topic keywords and,306
more importantly, the descriptive labels derived from a careful read of the top307
5 to 10 most probable documents. This procedure yielded a total of 23 sub-308
stantive meta-topics which cover themes related to science, energy, economics,309
international and domestic politics, and society. A full list of these meta-topics310
are displayed in Table 1 along with the labels and identification numbers of each311
meta-topic’s underlying topics, a measure of how often the meta-topic is sam-312
pled from the corpus (prevalence), and two classification accuracy scores which313
are discussed in detail in Section 3.1.2.314
3.1.2. Model validation315
A critical—if not the critical—step in any computer-assisted approach to316
content classification is model validation. If the specified model is working well,317
then the predicted primary topic or topics should correspond to the categories318
assigned by human coders. To construct a manually annotated set of documents319
to use for purposes of validation, we relied on the standard operating procedure320
of “inductive” content analysis: we use a small (randomly selected) set of docu-321
ments, classified the primary topic of each document using the 23 codes outlined322
in Table 1, discussed disagreements, and modified accordingly. More specifically,323
we repeated this inductive process until reliability was sufficiently high (Krip-324
pendorff’s α ≥ 0.80). After ensuring sufficient reliability, each individual coder325
classified the primary topic of 225 documents, leaving a total of 450 manually326
annotated for validation purposes.327
With a human-coded test set in hand, the next question is what criteria328
should be used to judge model validity. One approach is to draw on procedures329
commonly used to assess supervised learning problems, which include measuring330
some combination of classification accuracy, reliability, and precision. We rely on331
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Meta-Topic Label Prevalence F1 Score Underlying Topic Label [ID]
Top Top 2
Activism 0.01 0.73 0.76 Activism (Protests) [26], Earth Hour [30]
Agriculture 0.01 0.59 0.74 Food security [42]
Arctic politics 0.01 0.82 0.87 Arctic geopolitics [4]
Climate impacts 0.08 0.54 0.76 Water resources [27], Sea level rise [31], Archeology [35],
Housing [36], Wild life [41], Sea life [69],
Climate impacts (Mountains and glaciers) [73],
Climate consequences (Scientific forecast) [90]
Climate science 0.08 0.53 0.76 Space (Celestial bodies) [19], Carbon emissions [22],
Meteorology (Roshydromet) [24], Space science (Sun) [49],
Climate science (Ocean and climate) [62], Climate change (General) [84],
Science (Atmosphere) [93]
Comparative politics 0.04 0.63 0.68 Politics (Germany) [5], Politics (USA) [20], Politics (UK) [33],
Politics (South America) [54], Politics (Elections) [68], IR (China) [95]
Disasters/Extreme weather 0.07 0.72 0.83 Nature disaster (Forest fires) [0], Weather abnormalities [39],
Catastrophe (Futuristic predictions) [45],
Nature disaster (Hurricanes and floods) [58],
Catastrophe (Response/MCHS) [60], Winter abnormalities [66]
Economy/Business 0.08 0.47 0.67 Budgeting climate risk [1], Business [6], Economy general [29],
Corporate responsibility [59], Economy (Sustainable development) [86]
Education 0.01 0.36 0.67 Education [23], Education (University competition) [52]
Non-renewable energy 0.02 0.61 0.81 Energy (nuclear) [48], Energy (gas) [99]
Renewable energy 0.01 0.50 0.78 Energy (Sustainable sources) [8]
Energy efficiency 0.02 0.43 0.67 Transport (Mostly aviation) [15], Transport (Cars) [17],
Energy (Efficiency, Emission reduction) [82]
Health 0.01 0.86 1.00 Health [47]
Information technology 0.004 0.50 0.80 IT [78]
Int’l climate agreements 0.03 0.84 0.91 Climate research (Russian-Belarusian) [10], Climate politics (COPs) [28],
Climate politics (Kyoto Protocol) [61]
International politics 0.05 0.53 0.71 UN (and Russia) [21], IR (ASIA-APEC) [34], Politics (EU) [53],
IR (Summits) [64], IR (Bilateral relations) [83]
International security 0.05 0.5 0.71 Russian national security [50], IR (Power politics) [55], Military [65],
Russian national security policy [67], IR (Security-conflicts) [94],
Russian foreign policy [98]
Polar science 0.01 0.75 0.89 Antarctic [12], Arctic (Science) [89]
Pollution 0.01 0.29 0.46 Env. protection (General pollution) [57], Env. protection (Air pollution) [87]
Russian cities 0.01 0.25 0.33 Moscow [79]
Domestic climate politics 0.04 0.49 0.74 Russian legislation [2], Medvedev’s politics (Russian politics) [9],
Politics (Russian officials meet) [13], Russian mitigation legislature [40],
Russian diplomacy [51], Russian Politics (Ministries/docs) [91]
Science (other) 0.02 0.67 0.73 Russian Science [71], Scientific discoveries (Genetics) [96]
Society and culture 0.10 0.44 0.70 Historical mysteries [3], Justice (crime) [7], Art (Film/music industry) [11],
Nobel Prize [88], Sport [97], Art (Music) [25], Philosophy [43],
Population growth [46], Fashion [63], USSR [70], Religion [74],
Literature [75], Politics and Society [76]
Table 1: Meta-topics and underlying topics within the newspaper corpus. This table
provides the meta-topics determined using the methodological approach outlined in
Section 3.1.1. “Prevalence” offers a rough measure of the importance of a meta-topic
to the corpus and is measured using the proportion of words assigned by the LDA to
a particular meta-topic over the sample period. The table presents two measures of
predictive accuracy using the F1 score (see Section 3.1.2 for a full description). Lastly,
we present the topic labels that underlie each meta-topic.
this approach here. Table 1 examines classification accuracy using the harmonic332
mean of precision and recall—i.e., the well-known and often used “F1 score”.333
First, we compare the primary (or “top”) topic suggested by the model to the334
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primary topic identified by human coders. As demonstrated in Table 1, there335
is considerable variation in classification accuracy across the 23 categories, with336
the F1 score ranging from 0.84 (Health) to only 0.25 (Russian Cities). For337
the set of issues salient for the literature on Russian coverage of the climate338
issue, meta-topics such as International Climate Agreements (0.84) and Arctic339
Politics (0.82) are classified accurately, while other themes such as Domestic340
Climate Politics (0.49) do not perform well.341
Yet judging an LDA model based only on the primary topic alone offers a342
conservative assessment of model accuracy. Even a cursory glance at articles in343
the Russian media corpus suggests that a single story will often discuss multiple344
climate-related themes, and it is not always easy for either human or computer345
to decide on what topic is “primary.” To offer a less conservative assessment of346
predictive accuracy, we examine whether the model classifies the human-coded347
primary topic as either the first or the second most probable topic for each doc-348
ument in the sample. When doing so, the F1 scores improve considerably for349
several important climate-related themes (see Table 1). For instance, we ob-350
serve a sizeable increase in the F1 scores for energy-related themes, with both351
Non-renewable and Renewable Energy registering values near 0.80. Similarly, we352
observe a considerable increase in the F1 scores for the Climate Science and Cli-353
mate Impacts themes, as well as a dramatic improvement for Domestic climate354
politics and International security. Overall, while this analysis demonstrates a355
range of validity across the 23 meta-topics, we find reasonable predictive accu-356
racy for key climate-related themes.357
4. Explaining coverage: the correlates of climate change reporting358
We now turn to examining the correlates of climate change coverage. What359
societal- and newspaper-level factors explain variation in coverage on key climate-360
related issues in Russia? To examine this question, we focus on 23 newspapers361
for which sufficient data was available over the 2000 to 2014. These papers rep-362
resent a substantial percentage of the overall circulation in Russia and include363
a representative cross-section of papers based on ownership structure, politi-364
cal ideology, and ties to the Russian central government (see appendix table365
A.2). The remainder of this section outlines our variables of interest, statistical366
methodology, and presents our main empirical findings.367
4.1. Outcome variables368
The 23 meta-topics in Table 1 offer a detailed set of themes for measuring369
the intensity of climate coverage. Yet, to keep the analysis manageable, we fo-370
cus our attention on three sets of meta-topics that 1) cover salient themes that371
are important in the Russian climate change literature (Poberezhskaya 2014;372
Tynkkynen 2010; Wilson Rowe 2009; Yagodin 2010) and 2) exhibit reasonable373
levels of predictive accuracy (F1 top 2 > 0.70). First, we examine the intensity374
of coverage for two key aspects of climate change by combining climate science375
and climate impacts (see Table 1) into climate science & impacts. This variable376
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represents a core aspect of climate literacy and provides a useful means to gauge377
coverage of climate change fundamentals. Second, we combine international se-378
curity and arctic politics into geopolitics, which centers on discussions of climate379
change in the context of international relations. Further, we seek to explain vari-380
ation in how Russian newspapers have reported on climate change negotiations381
by investigating the international climate agreements meta-topic. Lastly, we in-382
vestigate the variation in newspaper attention on energy-related themes within383
the context of climate change by combining non-renewable energy, renewable384
energy, and energy efficiency into energy issues. Time-series plots of these out-385
come variables over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014 are illustrated in Figure C.5,386
which can be found in Appendix C.2 of the supplemental appendix.387
The obvious next step involves determining an operational definition for the388
selected themes. As described in Boussalis and Coan (2016), there is no agreed389
upon “best” strategy for generating measures from underlying topic data and the390
appropriateness of a particular strategy is contingent on the research question of391
interest. Given the literature on Russian climate communication, our primary392
interest is in determining how papers frame the climate issue and whether the393
framing changes according to national- and newspaper-level factors. In particu-394
lar, we examine how different papers make trade-offs when discussing different395
climate-related themes, focusing on the proportion of all words devoted to a396
particular meta-topic in Table 1 for each paper-quarter. As such, this measure397
allows us to examine under what context a particular paper discusses the issue398
of climate change.399
4.2. National and newspaper-level covariates400
We also focus on national and newspaper-level covariates considered impor-401
tant in the communications literature. Classifying Russian newspapers’ own-402
ership, ideology and their relations with the state has proven to be a difficult403
task for researchers, and as Koltsova (2006) notes due to the rapid and constant404
changes in the Russian media market, these variables often remain a mystery405
even to market actors. In order to eliminate as many coding inaccuracies as406
possible, we have consulted a range of sources including: web-pages of the stud-407
ied newspapers, publicly available databases (e.g. media-atlas.ru, mediageo.ru)408
and relevant literature sources (e.g. Nenashev 2010, Strovskiy 2011, Zassoursky409
2004). To account for national level variables which may influence newspaper410
coverage of climate change, we control for consumer prices and the occurrence411
of extreme temperature, drought and storm events. A list of the variables along412
with their levels and descriptions are presented in Table 2.413
4.3. Statistical methods414
The next challenge is finding a suitable statistical model to examine variation415
in climate coverage as a function of key covariates. We assume that decisions416
regarding climate coverage result from a mixture of two random processes: news-417
papers first decide whether to discuss the issue of climate change at a given point418
in time and next decide how much coverage to devote to a particular theme.419
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Variable Label Levels Description
Ownership structure Business Ownership structure is dominated by the business
organisations with interests outside of the media market
State Predominately state-owned newspapers
Journalist collective Predominately owned by people with main
interests in the media market
Political party Owned by oppositional political parties
Energy Yes Owners have interests in energy sector
No No obvious connection with energy sector
Political spectrum Left Supports or advocates socialist/communist ideas
Centre Supports or advocates ideas of political and economic
stability, and traditional values
Right Supports or advocates ideas of capitalism and liberalism
Kremlin affiliation Pro-Kremlin Non-state owned paper supports government in power
Independent No obvious support for the government in power
from non-state owned paper
Inflation Mean = 11.78 Average quarterly consumer prices (all items),
SD = 5.04 percentage change on the same period
of the previous year (OECD 2016).
Disasters Mean = 0.67 Quarterly counts of extreme temperature,
SD = 1.00 drought and storm events (Guha-Sapir et al. 2015).
Table 2: National and newspaper-level variables and descriptions. Note: The identi-
fication of the Russian political spectrum is a complex task, as notions of the political
“right”, “centre” and “left” have been altered and even swapped over time (see more
in Simonsen 2001). In this article we have adopted the most common interpretation of
the concepts. Summary statistics and descriptions are also presented for Inflation and
Disasters.
More specifically, we model climate coverage using a mixture of a Bernoulli420
distribution for the decision to cover the issue at all and a beta distribution421
to represent coverage intensity (see the appendix for technical details). While a422
Bernoulli-beta mixture model offers a flexible approach to examining the skewed423
and zero-inflated proportions that are typical in our data, the standard setup424
ignores the clustering produced by examining a cross-section of newspapers over425
time. We thus extend the standard model to include random effects for both426
the newspaper (n = 23 papers) and time (t = 58 quarters). All of the models427
presented below are estimated using a fully Bayesian approach (see the appendix428
for additional details).429
4.4. Results430
We begin with the first step in the data generating process by examining the431
factors that influence whether or not a paper covers climate change at all in a432
particular quarter. Figure 2 provides estimates from a logistic regression for the433
decision to cover the climate issue, where the outcome is equal to 1 if a paper434
mentions climate change in a given quarter and zero otherwise. The figure plots435
the estimated coefficients (log odds) for each variable of interest based on the436
median posterior value, while also providing 90% credible intervals. To ease the437
interpretation, we set the baseline category to the group expected, a priori, to438
have the most overall coverage of climate change based on the past scholarship:439
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Figure 2: Explaining variation of any mention of climate change. Dots represent
parameter estimates based on the posterior median; lines provide the 90% highest
density intervals. The baseline represents the newspaper profile expected to cover
climate change most frequently: left leaning, journalist-owned newspapers, with no
direct energy interest, and not affiliated with the Kremlin. The estimated coefficient
for the intercept (not shown) is 5.7 (HDI = [2.8, 8.5]).
left-leaning papers, owned by journalists, without a direct energy interest, and440
not beholden to the Kremlin (Poberezhskaya 2015). The results generally fit with441
expectations. The overall state of the economy—as measured by inflation—has442
the largest overall influence on the probability of covering the climate issue. Not443
surprisingly, when times are tough economically, climate change is less likely444
to appear in the news agenda: moving inflation from its minimum to maximum445
value—while fixing all other variables at constant values—leads to a 0.10 decline446
in the probability of covering climate change. This level of change, however,447
represents a considerable swing in economic conditions and, for more moderate448
changes (e.g., from the 1st to the 3rd quartile of inflation), inflation leads to a449
roughly 1% decline in discussing climate-related issues. Energy ownership also450
reduces the propensity of a newspaper to report on climate-related issues, with451
the likelihood of covering climate change again falling by roughly 1% for papers452
owned by an energy company. Lastly, opposition party papers are approximately453
2% less likely to mention climate change at all—though, this estimate is quite454
uncertain. We do not find a significant difference in the likelihood of climate455
change coverage between Putin or Medvedev presidential periods. Further, we456
do not find a significant conditional relationship between presidential period457
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and state-owned or Kremlin-loyal papers on the probability of covering climate458
change (not shown).459
Examining mentions alone, however, offers little insight into how climate460
change is being covered in the Russian press. That is, if a paper decides to cover461
the climate issue, in what context do they do so? To examine this question,462
we use the relative measure of coverage intensity introduced in Section 4.1 and463
the mixed effects zero-inflated beta model outlined in Section 4.3. We begin464
with two central features of climate change communication—reporting on cli-465
mate science & impacts. As demonstrated in Figure 3, we find support for the466
impact of national-level variables on coverage of climate science in the Russian467
press. Specifically, we find that if a paper covers climate change during times of468
high inflation, the discussion is less likely to be framed around climate science469
(log-odds = -1.03, CI = [-1.96, -0.26]). Moving inflation from one standard de-470
viation above to one standard deviation below the mean leads to around an 8%471
decline in the likelihood of emphasizing climate science and impacts. Conversely,472
during periods with high instances of natural disaster, coverage is more likely473
to emphasize scientific discussion (log-odds = 0.07, CI = [0.02, 0.13]). Here,474
moving from no extreme weather events to 4 extreme weather events (i.e., the475
maximum), increases the likelihood of framing discussion in terms of climate476
science and impacts by roughly 7%. There does not seem to be a substantive477
presidential effect on how newspapers discuss climate science & impacts. Fur-478
ther, by and large, there is little evidence for newspaper-level effects. There are,479
however, several exceptions: right-leaning (log-odds = -0.22, CI = [-0.64, 0.18])480
and opposition party papers (log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.93, 0.11]) are generally481
less likely to emphasize science, while state-owned newspapers are more likely482
to focus on science-related issues (log-odds = 0.30, CI = [-0.10, 0.72])—though,483
again, uncertainty remains relatively high for these estimates.484
Next, we move beyond science to issues associated with the political econ-485
omy of climate change in Russia. Figure 3 provides estimates for our aggregate486
measure of geopolitics. As shown in the figure, both paper-level and national-487
level factors seem to play a role in the level of climate-related discussion devoted488
to geopolitical issues. Considering paper-level variables, energy ownership in-489
fluences discussion of geopolitics, yet papers with energy interests are only less490
than 1% more likely to cover climate change in the context of international rela-491
tions. Oppositional party papers are also more likely to frame climate coverage492
in the context of security concerns and international competition over the Arc-493
tic region (log-odds = 0.52, CI = [0.07, 0.97]). To a lesser extent, right-leaning494
and state-owned papers are more likely to cover climate change in the context495
of geopolitics—though, there is still a fair level of uncertainty associated with496
both estimates. And we continue to find evidence for the influence of economic497
conditions; when inflation is high, papers are more likely to frame the climate498
change debate in terms of geopolitical competition. Further, when disaggregat-499
ing geopolitics into international security and arctic politics (not shown), we find500
that security is largely responsible for driving geopolitical frames. That is, the501
effects of energy and opposition party ownership as well as inflation are stronger502
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Figure 3: Coverage of specific climate-related issues. Dots represent the parameter
estimates (posterior medians) from the zero-inflated beta regression model described
in Section 4.3, and the lines once again represent the 90% HDI. We employ the same
baseline as Figure 2 above and thus compare to a “high frequency” newspaper profile.
The estimated intercepts (not shown) are as follows: climate science and impacts (-
0.59, [-1.55, 0.32]), geopolitics (-4.55, [-5.68, -3.48]), energy issues (-3.46, [-4.42, -2.60]),
and international agreements (-2.22, [-3.74, -0.74]).
when focusing on international security alone. There does seem to be a marginal503
presidential effect. Specifically, we find that during a Putin presidency, papers504
are less likely (log-odds = -0.15, CI = [-0.31, -0.01]) to discuss climate change in505
the context of geopolitics, however the effect is quite small: newspapers under a506
Putin presidency are only 0.4% less likely to frame global warming in terms of507
geopolitical concerns.508
The analysis next shifts to climate change discussions in the context of in-509
ternational climate agreements. Again, economic hardship, as measured by in-510
flation, has a negative impact on newspaper attention to climate change nego-511
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tiations (log-odds = -1.60, CI = [-3.08, -0.28]). For instance, moving inflation512
from one standard deviation below its mean to one standard deviation above, de-513
creases discussion on global warming negotiations by roughly 4%. With respect514
to newspaper-level variables, the results suggest that state- (log-odds = 0.47, CI515
= [0.0001, 0.90]) and business-owned newspapers (log-odds = 0.36, CI = [0.14,516
0.59]) are more likely to frame global warming along the lines of climate diplo-517
macy. Substantively, government ownership is associated with an approximate518
5% increase in discussion, while business group ownership leads to a roughly 4%519
increase.520
Lastly, we examine the extent to which newspapers frame climate coverage521
in terms of energy issues. Not surprisingly, business-owned newspapers are more522
likely to emphasize climate change in the context of energy issues (log-odds =523
0.20, CI = [0.03, 0.39]). Yet, the strongest newspaper-level effects are observed524
for state-owned (log-odds = 0.45, CI = [0.08, 0.82]) and opposition party papers525
(log-odds = -0.40, CI = [-0.78, -0.06]). State-owned papers are approximately 2%526
more likely to highlight energy issues when covering global warming, while op-527
position party papers are 2% less likely to do so. When digging a bit deeper into528
these estimates, we find that attention devoted to renewable energy and energy529
efficiency play a particularly influential role. While we observe weak differences530
across papers for non-renewable energy, business- and state-owned papers have531
a strong positive influence on the likelihood of framing climate change in terms532
of “energy solutions,” while opposition party outlets generally avoid discussion533
of these issues. We also find a negative effect of a Putin presidency on discus-534
sions of climate change with respect to energy issues (log-odds = -0.17, CI =535
[-0.36, -0.002]). However, yet again, this effect is substantively small: newspa-536
pers during a Putin presidency are 0.2% less likely to discuss climate change in537
the context of energy.538
5. Discussion539
Newspaper attention to climate change has risen steadily ever since the issue540
was identified as an international problem. A key question for both scholars541
of climate communication and Russian politics centers on the similarities and542
differences of Russian media coverage to other major actors in climate politics.543
We start by considering overall trends in coverage of the issue. Boykoff et al.544
(2015) demonstrates how interest by the global press increased rapidly starting545
in late 2006 and remained high for the following few years (see also Schmidt et al.546
2013). This increase coincided with important events such as the release of the547
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (AR4), the release of Al Gore’s An Inconvinient548
Truth, and the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to Al Gore and the IPCC.549
There is another pronounced spike in attention in late 2009 that was triggered by550
the Copenhagen Conference (COP-15) on climate change and the “Climategate”551
scandal that preceded it. Our data suggest that Russian newspaper attention552
generally followed this pattern and, in particular, we find noticeable similarities553
between Russian coverage and that of the U.S. prestige press (see Figure 1). Yet,554
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although the general trends are similar, there are several key differences. First,555
and perhaps most importantly, our analysis confirms that Russian newspaper556
coverage of climate change is relatively low in absolute terms (Poberezhskaya557
2015). As demonstrated in Figure 1, a single major American newspaper (The558
New York Times) has published more articles on climate change than 23 of559
the most widely circulated papers in Russia. This low level of media attention560
may offer an explanation of why, when compared to 40 developing and developed561
nations, Russians are the most likely to report that “global climate change is not562
a serious problem” (Stokes et al. 2015). Second, while it seems that international563
media have picked up their interest in climate change in recent years and it has564
again acquired “celebrity status” (Pepermans and Maeseele 2014 p. 217; see565
also Fischer 2015), we find that Russian newspaper coverage has been steadily566
decreasing since 2010, with a pronounced drop starting in late 2013. This decline567
in coverage, moreover, corresponds to an increase in media attention associated568
with the Russian economic crisis and the onset of the security crisis in Ukraine.569
Next, moving from trends in general attention to the correlates Russian cli-570
mate coverage, we find that the state of the economy is crucial for predicting571
both whether climate change makes onto the media agenda and the way in which572
the issue is framed. When economic conditions are bad (as measured by high573
inflation), the media tend to avoid discussion of global warming and discuss cli-574
mate change less in the context of science and international commitments, but575
more with respect to geopolitical concerns. In other words, instead of portraying576
climate change as an environmental problem, during hard times, the media will577
present climate change as just another item of discussion in the international578
arena, outlining opportunities which could be realized with a shift in global579
climate conditions. The influence of the economy on climate change commu-580
nication has been identified in other countries as well. For instance, Carvalho581
(2005 , p. 21), in her analysis of the UK media points out how “free-market582
capitalism and neo-liberalism” restrict climate public discourse by encouraging583
the avoidance of problematic topics (e.g. restrictions of the economic growth in584
order to mitigate the problem). Holt and Barkemeyer (2012) also find negative585
effects of poor national economic performance on coverage of climate change in a586
large comparative study of 112 newspapers from 39 countries. As such, our anal-587
ysis provides additional evidence that economic conditions plays an important588
role in governing the well-known “issue attention cycle” (Downs 1972).589
Previous research also suggests that Russian media coverage of climate change590
is sensitive to political factors (Poberezhskaya 2015). Interestingly, our study591
provides little evidence of substantive variation in climate change coverage or592
attention to various climate change related themes between different presiden-593
tial administrations (Putin vs. Medvedev). Further, we do not find conditional594
presidential administration effects on how state-owned newspapers or papers595
that are loyal to the Kremlin discuss climate change. That is, newspapers that596
are beholden to the government do not discuss global warming differently when597
Putin or Medvedev are serving as President. Also, non-state-owned newspapers598
that are loyal to the Kremlin do not seem to systematically differ from the base-599
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line case in their reporting of global warming. These results contribute to the600
on-going academic debate on the role of the personality of the state leaders in601
shaping climate discussion in Russia (Henry and Sundstrom 2012). The weak602
evidence found in our study could be explained by the constant powerful impact603
of Putin’s politics regardless of whether he is the Prime Minister or President.604
On the other hand, as Andonova (2008) states, Russian climate policy cannot605
simply be explained by the will of the executive but rather by a combination of606
various political processes.607
We also find a much weaker role for natural disasters in explaining variation in608
coverage of global warming and framing of the issue by the Russian press. Our609
results indicate that the occurrence of climate-related natural hazards, such610
as extreme temperature, drought and storms, are associated with an increase611
in discussions of climate science and climate impact. However, we find little612
evidence of a disaster effect on overall coverage rates or discussion of energy,613
geopolitics, or international climate negotiations. Given these findings, we might614
speculate that natural disasters bring climate change to the realm of popular615
scientific discourse by trying to explain events, providing advice or raising the616
alarm of the observed (or possible) negative outcomes. This correlates with617
Wilson Rowe’s (2013) argument that while Russian climate scientists rarely act618
as “policy entrepreneurs” but rather concentrate on educating policy-makers619
and the public by explaining the scientific side of the problem.620
While national-level factors are predictive, paper-level characteristics also621
play a role, with papers varying in how they frame the issue. In terms of news-622
papers’ political affiliation and ownership, there is some evidence to suggest623
that the media outlets on the political right are less likely to address climate624
change in terms of science and impact. However, when such papers do discuss625
climate science, they typically provide a rational account of anthropogenic cli-626
mate change with descriptions of its cause and consequences. Newspapers on627
the extreme political left and right bring into their discussion of climate science628
sensationalism and in some cases governmental critique:629
The region is not yet experiencing climatic difficulties, and its prob-630
lems are due to the irrational management of agricultural production631
and water waste (Pravda 9/01/2004)632
On the other hand, newspapers of the political center express a range of views633
on the issue. Moreover, when taking a closer look at the corpus—particularly634
among state-owned papers—there are clear instances of climate scepticism. For635
instance:636
Global warming will soon finish (Rossiiskaia gazeta 19/09/2007)637
Maybe the president’s advisor, Andrey Illarionov [an infamous Rus-638
sian climate sceptic], is right in his stubborn resistance to the Kyoto639
Protocol? (Rossiiskaia gazeta 31/08/2005)640
This finding also correlates with the development of the state’s climate policy,641
which until a few years ago was dominated by sceptical discourse. Newspapers642
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with connections to the energy sector mostly tend to look at the problem from643
the position of international security which often involves discussion of Russian644
energy interests. For instance, when surveying climate-related articles in our645
corpus with a high probability of containing a topic related to geopolitics, we646
found numerous discussions of global competition for the Arctic’s resources by647
papers with energy interests:648
Russia continues to strengthen its positions in the unavoidable divi-649
sion of the Arctic [...] The Arctic shelf presumably contains up to650
25 per cent of the world’s hydrocarbon reserves, and in connection651
with global warming, the possibility of their extraction becomes real.652
(Izvestiia 24/12/2008)653
A similar pattern was detected with oppositional and right-wing newspapers also654
being more likely to discuss climate change in relation to international relations.655
However, these papers differ slightly in their approach, where the media outlets656
from the political right provide a more straightforward account of the potential657
losses and gains in the geopolitics of climate change. In contrast, newspapers658
belonging to the extreme left and right tend to briefly mention climate change659
in their elaborate analyses of global politics:660
Today Anglophone plans are implemented under the guise of a state-661
less “globalization” and ultra-Malthusian scam called “global warm-662
ing,” pushed by former US Vice President Al Gore’ (Zavtra 18/4/2007)663
Our study also demonstrates that ownership structures impact the way Rus-664
sian newspapers approach energy-related topics, with business-owned and state-665
owned papers not only mentioning climate change within energy discussions666
more often, but also paying greater attention to “energy solutions” (e.g., renew-667
ables and energy efficiency). Izvestiia, for example, has pointed to American668
excess when discussing how, “until recently uneconomical and environmentally669
‘dirty’ cars were the most popular choice among American consumers” (Izvestiia670
13/02/2004). Business owned papers were likely to express an interest in energy671
conservation as well:672
The country has a long-term commitment to provide energy for ex-673
port. It is currently almost the only real means of Russia’s political674
influence [...] Therefore, Russia has to seriously think about a more675
rational use of its energy resources, as well as of the use of energy-676
saving technologies’ (Kommersant 19/10/2005).677
A similar pattern was noticed in how these types of newspapers tackle the topic of678
international environmental agreements by strategically assessing Russia’s gains679
and losses from the process:680
Russia needs to fit into a new global climate order. While Russia does681
not persevere in promoting their GHG emission reduction projects, in682
April 2009 a new US administration has claimed its global leadership683
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in the fight to preserve the environment and to development the ideas684
of global “climate control” (Rossiiskaia gazeta 6/05/2009).685
Our data also show how media coverage is influenced by similar considerations as686
the Russian state’s climate policy. Interest in the issue began to “take off” after687
policy makers began to consider mitigation efforts for their potential benefits to688
the country (e.g. introducing renewables into the national market in order to689
increase fossil fuel exports , reducing energy costs, attracting investments, etc.).690
Though this approach may be seen as “green washing,” in the Russian case, it691
offers a tangible—and even optimal—solution for attracting the interest of the692
state. Moreover, this approach allows for increased attention without causing a693
political confrontation among key stakeholders by demanding economic sacrifice694
and allocating blame for over-reliance on the fossil fuel industry.695
6. Conclusion696
This study offers a systematic and comprehensive analysis of Russian news-697
paper coverage and discussion of climate change since the end of the Yeltsin era.698
Employing methods from machine learning and natural language processing, we699
have been able to classify a large set of climate-relevant newspaper articles into700
distinct themes related to global warming. Using a sub-sample from these data,701
we investigate whether a set of national and newspaper-level factors help ex-702
plain variation in Russian newspaper coverage of climate change as well as how703
newspapers frame the issue over the period 2000-2014. Overall, our analysis704
has helped us to understand when climate change is more or less likely to enter705
Russian public discourse (the first level of the agenda-setting function of mass706
media (McCombs and Shaw 1972), and how newspapers cover climate change707
during its peaks and lows of attention (the second level of media agenda-setting708
function (ibid)). We find that national level factors such as the state of the709
economy are highly predictive of coverage, while paper-level indicators are less710
consistently related to changes in the media discourse.711
While the current study focuses on the issue of climate change, our empirical712
findings raise broader questions on the political economy of media production in713
Russia. First, it is clear from our analysis that economic considerations—general714
economic conditions and energy interests—play a vital role in what the media715
choose to present. Second, it is striking just how little variation one observes716
across newspapers with very different underlying ideologies and ownership struc-717
tures. These findings, moreover, are at odds with scholarship based on West-718
ern countries—primarily in the US and UK—which suggests that the ideological719
predispositions of media outlets significantly influence which issues are discussed720
and how these issues are framed (for ideology and climate change coverage, see721
for instance Carvalho 2007, Schmid-Petri et al. 2015), though there is evidence722
that Dutch newspapers are also not affected by ideological disposition on the723
issue of climate change (Dirikx and Gelders 2010). Similarly, changes at the ex-724
ecutive level—from an arguably skeptical Putin to the environmentally-minded725
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Medvedev—did not appear to systematically alter how the media covered climate726
change. And though speculative, the consistency of coverage across (seemingly)727
diverse media outlets underscores the challenge of getting the issue of climate728
change onto the political agenda and perhaps offers an observable implication729
of wider changes in the Russian media market, which has become increasingly730
centralised and controlled over the last decade (Lehtisaari 2015). While it is731
difficult to know the extent to which these findings generalize to other political732
issues, the analysis does raise questions regarding how media operate in Russia733
and the ways in which corporate elite influence the media landscape.734
The study does, however, have a number of limitations. First, our analysis735
does not consider the sentiment and tone of the newspaper articles. For instance,736
when a paper is discussing climate science, we cannot determine whether the737
author is being skeptical or dismissive. This is an important drawback which738
should be addressed in future work. Second, the study relies exclusively on739
print media, while not including television, radio, and online media, which might740
present a more complete picture of climate discourse in Russia. Lastly, due to741
data availability, we were forced to exclude newspaper articles from the Yeltsin742
era. We, therefore, are not able to generalize our findings on newspaper coverage743
to the 1990s.744
Nevertheless, our results offer a number of valuable insights into climate745
change communication in Russia. During the Paris COP-21 meeting in Septem-746
ber 2015, President Putin re-affirmed Russia’s pledge to contribute to the global747
fight against climate change through further GHG reductions. Some have thought748
that Putin could have been more ambitious in his claim since a reduction of 25-749
30% in GHG emissions to the 1990 level will not revolutionise Russia’s energy750
market. On the other hand, considering Russia’s ambiguous history of climate751
change policy, any move forward should be treated as a positive development752
where the interested parties (climatologists, environmental activists and the in-753
ternational community) should not only understand all of the intricacies of Rus-754
sian climate discourse but should also learn how Russian media can be utilised755
in order to popularise climate-related discussions. In other words, focus should756
be shifted to when climate is more likely to receive attention from the Russian757
media and how it can be framed in order to involve various media actors re-758
gardless of their ownership structure, energy interests and political affiliation.759
It is our belief that this study makes a substantial contribution in this regard760
and can also be utilised as a platform for further inquiries into Russian public761
discourse of climate change-related topics.762
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Supplemental appendix for “Measuring and Modeling1018
Russian Newspaper Coverage of Climate Change.”1019
Appendix A. Text analysis1020
Appendix A.1. Corpus1021
The corpus was compiled using newspaper articles gathered from the East-1022
view Russian Central Newspapers database, which may be accessed at http:1023
//www.eastview.com/. The Boolean search term used to identify relevant arti-1024
cles was as follows:1025
"Изменение климата" OR "изменения климата" OR "изменению1026
климата" OR "изменением климата" OR "изменении климата"1027
OR "Изменения климата" OR "изменений климата" OR "изме-1028
нениям климата" OR "изменениями климата" OR "изменени-1029
ях климата" OR "Глобальное потепление" OR "глобального по-1030
тепления" OR "глобальному потеплению" OR "глобальным по-1031
теплением" OR "глобальном потеплении" OR "Парниковый эф-1032
фект" OR "парникового эффекта" OR "парниковому эффекту"1033
OR "парниковым эффектом" OR "парниковом эффекте".1034
This search resulted in the retrieval of 11,131 articles from 65 newspapers over1035
the period 3 May 1980 to 7 May 2014. Table A.3 displays the number of articles1036
per newspaper and the time coverage of each newspaper (both in our corpus1037
and in the Eastview database). It should be noted that there is considerable1038
variation in newspaper duration within the corpus. The count of climate change1039
related articles over the entire period is illustrated in Figure A.4. As can be seen1040
in the plot, attention to climate change within our corpus begins to pick up in1041
1995, with pre-1995 coverage of climate change amounting to only 51 articles1042
(Argumenty i fakty [n=12], Izvestiia [n=33], and Krasnaia zvezda [n=6]). The1043
low number of pre-1995 articles should not be interpreted as a reflection of the1044
true coverage rate of the Russian print media during this period. As is shown1045
in Table A.3, the overwhelming majority of newspapers entered the Eastview1046
database beginning in the late 1990s and early 2000s. For this reason, our1047
analysis focuses on the 2000-2014 period.1048
Table A.3: Newspaper coverage of climate change in Russia
Newspaper Article Temporal Coverage
Corpus Eastview (UDB-COM)
Argumenty i fakty 261 1983-2014 1983-
Argumenty nedeli 23 2011-2014 2011-
E’kho planety 148 2000-2008 2000-
E’konomika i zhizn’ 46 1996-2014 1996-
E’kspert 204 1998-2014 1998-
Ezhenedel’nyi’ zhurnal 10 2003-2004 2003-2004
31
Table A.3: (Continued)
Finansovye Izvestiia 2 2002-2002 1998-2003
Gazeta 342 2003-2010 2002-2010
InterFaks-Vremia 5 1998-1999 1997-2000
Itogi 299 1996-2013 1996-2014
Izvestiia 959 1980-2014 1980-
Kommersant. Daily 555 1997-2014 1997-
Kommersant. Den’gi 34 1999-2008 1999-
Kommersant. Vlast’ 54 1998-2008 1998-
Komsomol’skaia pravda 345 1997-2014 1997-
Konservator 4 2003-2003 2002-2003
Krasnaia zvezda 270 1992-2014 1992-
Kul’tura 48 2004-2014 2003-
Literaturnaia gazeta 125 1997-2014 1997-
Moskovskaia pravda 540 1998-2014 1998-
Moskovskie novosti 180 1998-2013 1998-2007; 2011-2014
Moskovskii’ komsomolets 516 1997-2014 1997-
NG. Dipkur’er 5 2000-2001 2000-2001
NG. Figury i litsa 1 2000-2000 1997-2001
NG. Polite’konomiia 5 1998-2001 1997-2001
NG. Regiony 3 1999-2001 1997-2001
NG. Sodruzhestvo 2 1998-2000 1997-2001
NG. Stsenarii 5 1997-2001 1997-2001
Nasha versiia 30 2005-2008 2005-
New Times, The 42 2007-2013 2007-
Nezavisimaia gazeta 828 1997-2014 1995-
Novaia gazeta 159 1998-2014 1997-
Novoe vremia 25 2003-2006 2003-2007
Novye izvestiia 443 1998-2014 1998-
Obshchaia gazeta 38 1997-2002 1997-2002
Ogonek 176 2003-2014 2003-
Paradox 14 2002-2004 2002-2004
Politbiuro 26 2002-2003 2002-2003
Pravda 66 2004-2014 2003-
Pravda 5 4 1997-1998 1997-1998
Pravda 5. Daily 8 1997-1998 1997-1998
Pravoslavnaia Moskva 3 2000-2008 1999-
Prezident 25 2010-2013 2010-2014
Profil’ 191 1998-2014 1998-
RBK Daily 19 2012-2014 2012-
Rossii’skaia gazeta 928 1997-2014 1997-
Rossii’skie vesti 101 1997-2013 1997-
Rossiia 73 2002-2010 2002-2010
Russkii’ Telegraf 6 1998-1998 1998-1998
Russkii’ kur’er 58 2003-2008 2003-2008
Sankt-Peterburgskie vedomosti 455 1997-2014 1997-
Segodnia 66 1997-2001 1996-2001
Slovo 49 1999-2013 1999-
Sovetskaia Rossiia 186 1999-2014 1999-
Tribuna 188 2004-2014 2004-2015
Trud 397 1997-2014 1997-
Uchitel’skaia gazeta 52 2005-2014 2005-
Vecherniaia Moskva 256 2000-2014 2000-
Vedomosti 10 2010-2014 2014-
Vedomosti (arkhiv) 403 1999-2013 1999-2013
Vek 50 1999-2002 1999-2002
Versiia 7 2004-2005 2003-2005
Vremia MN 146 1998-2003 1998-2003
Vremia novostei’ 499 2001-2010 2001-2010
Zavtra 113 1998-2014 1996-
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Figure A.4: The number of climate change related newspaper articles over time.
Illustrates the temporal variation of climate change coverage for 65 Russian newspapers
over the period 1980-2014. Quarterly article counts are displayed.
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Appendix B. Probabilistic topic model1050
To reduce our text content into a manageable set of key themes, we utilize the1051
latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model originally proposed in Blei et al. (2003)1052
(see Blei 2012 for an accessible overview). Boussalis and Coan (2016 p. 92)1053
provide a useful description of the LDA’s assumed data generating process:1054
“LDA provides a statistical framework for understanding the latent1055
topics or themes running through a corpus by explicitly modelling the1056
random process responsible for producing a document, assuming that1057
each document is made up of a mixture of topics, as well as a mix-1058
ture of words associated with each topic. For instance, the document1059
you are reading at this moment includes a mixture of themes such as1060
“climate scepticism” and “text analysis,” and these themes tend to1061
use different language—the topic “climate scepticism” is likely asso-1062
ciated with the word “denial,” whereas the topic “text analysis” is1063
associated with the word “random.” Moreover, this process is prob-1064
abilistic in the sense that we could have used the term “stochastic”1065
instead of “random” in the previous sentence.”1066
Although most individuals do not equate the process of writing with randomness,1067
this turns out to be a useful fiction when the goal is to cluster a large body of1068
text into a small number of themes. More formally, Blei et al. (2003) assume1069
1) that words are exchangeable, each text is a combination of a specific number1070
of topics (Tk), and topics are represented as a distribution of words (w) over a1071
fixed vocabulary (see also Griffiths and Steyvers 2004). With these assumptions1072
in hand, LDA assumes the follwoing generative process:1073
1. Each of the k topics are drawn from a topic distribution by1074
θ ∼ Dirichlet(α)1075
2. The term distribution β for each topic is represented by1076
β ∼ Dirichlet(η)1077
3. For each of the N words wn:1078
Randomly sample a topic zn ∼Multinomial(θ).1079
Choose a word wn from p(wn|zn, β).1080
We rely on the sparse Gibbs sampler described in Yao et al. (2009) to infer the1081
topic structure and the hyperparameter optimization routine utilized in Wallach1082
et al. (2009a) provided the most easily interpretable set of topics. Note also that1083
the LDA requires one to specify the number of topics a priori. While a range1084
of methods have been introduced in the literature to estimate the “natural”1085
number of topics for a corpus based on the held-out likelihood (see Wallach1086
et al. 2009b for an overview), there remains considerable debate on the utility1087
of data-driven approaches and Chang et al. (2009) present evidence suggesting1088
models which preform better in terms of held-out likelihood, may actually infer1089
34
less meaningful topics. However, for our analysis, we are using the LDA as a1090
tool for data reduction and thus we chose the number of topics that we could1091
read through and analyze using qualitiative methods.1092
35
Appendix B.1. Full List of Topics1093
This table provides the results of the 100 topic LDA for the Russian newspaper corpus, as descried in section X. We removed1094
10 “junk” topics (AlSumait et al. 2009) and four “non-applicable (NA)” topics where climate change related terminology is1095
used in unrelated contexts (e.g. “greenhouse” used in the context of gardening). This left us with a final set of 86 relevant1096
topics which cover a wide range of subjects. These topics where then grouped into higher order sets (meta-topics) based on1097
subject similarity. For each topic, we present the topic ID, Dirichlet statistic, topic label, meta-topic label, and the top 51098
most probable (stemmed) tokens (in Russian).1099
Table B.4: Climate change related topics in the Russian newspaper corpus
ID Dirichlet Topic Meta-Topic Token Keys
26 0.01707 Activism (Protests) Activism протест антиглобалист полицейск полиц акц
30 0.02717 Earth Hour Activism выставк акц час москв город
42 0.02772 Food security Agriculture цен хозяйств сельск производств продовольствен
4 0.02755 Arctic geopolitics Arctic politics арктик арктическ северн росс морск
35 0.0242 Archaeology Climate impacts учен древн мамонт человек животн
90 0.08167 Climate consequences (scientific forecast) Climate impacts климат изменен потеплен глобальн климатическ
73 0.0189 Climate impacts (Mountains and glaciers) Climate impacts курорт турист ледник гор снег
36 0.03449 Housing Climate impacts дом здан строительств жил работ
31 0.0756 Sea level rise Climate impacts потеплен глобальн температур учен земл
69 0.02127 Sea life Climate impacts мор вод морск рыб акул
27 0.02722 Water resources Climate impacts вод рек водн ресурс проект
41 0.03265 Wild life Climate impacts животн вид птиц медвед бел
22 0.05471 Carbon emissions Climate science газ атмосфер парников углекисл выброс
84 0.1319 Climate change (General) Climate science изменен климат последн фактор процесс
62 0.03049 Climate science (Oceans and climate) Climate science океа вод европ течен северн
24 0.0193 Meteorology (Roshydromet) Climate science прогноз погод метеоролог росгидромет дан
93 0.03666 Science (Atmosphere) Climate science атмосфер сло озонов учен вод
19 0.02448 Space (Celestial bodies) Climate science космическ земл планет марс венер
49 0.02689 Space science (Sun) Climate science земл солнц солнечн планет учен
95 0.02206 IR (China) Comparative politics кита китайск кит кнр пекин
68 0.03608 Politics (Elections) Comparative politics парт выбор президент политическ политик
5 0.01914 Politics (Germany) Comparative politics герман немецк меркел канцлер берлин
54 0.01186 Politics (South America) Comparative politics стран штат куб соединен фидел
33 0.02433 Politics (UK) Comparative politics британск великобритан блэр лондон браун
20 0.05483 Politics (USA) Comparative politics сша американск президент буш обам
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45 0.04216 Catastrophe (Futuristic predictions) Disasters/Extreme Weather земл катастроф человечеств планет будущ
60 0.04093 Catastrophe (Response/MCHS) Disasters/Extreme Weather област росс регион кра мчс
0 0.02266 Nature disaster (Forest fires) Disasters/Extreme Weather лес лесн пожар дерев площад
58 0.05216 Nature disaster (Hurricanes and floods) Disasters/Extreme Weather наводнен бедств землетрясен урага катастроф
39 0.06588 Weather abnormalities Disasters/Extreme Weather температур градус погод тепл жар
66 0.02545 Winter abnormalities Disasters/Extreme Weather зим мороз снег холод зимн
1 0.07459 Budgeting climate risk Economy/Business млн млрд доллар тыс проект
6 0.04502 Business Economy/Business компан бизнес рынк крупн проект
59 0.08378 Corporate responsibility Economy/Business должн наш возможн помощ нов
86 0.08094 Economy (Sustainable development) Economy/Business развит стран экономическ экономик нов
29 0.03492 Economy (General) Economy/Business экономик цен кризис финансов рост
23 0.0315 Education Education школ дет образован язык студент
52 0.00196 Education (University competition) Education задан участник как факультет математик
99 0.03547 Energy (Gas) Energy (Non-renewable) нефт газ цен добыч нефтян
48 0.01637 Energy (Nuclear) Energy (Non-renewable) атомн ядерн аэс энергетик реактор
8 0.03108 Energy (Sustainable sources) Energy (Renewable) энерг энергетик топлив источник электроэнерг
82 0.03162 Energy (Efficiency, Emission reduction) Energy efficiency выброс энерг газ энергетическ технолог
17 0.01763 Transport (Cars) Energy efficiency автомобил машин двигател бензин нов
15 0.02056 Transport (Mostly aviation) Energy efficiency самолет аэропорт авиакомпан пассажир полет
47 0.03596 Health Health заболеван болезн здоров врач люд
78 0.02056 IT Information technology технолог систем создан разработк информацион
28 0.05005 Climate politics (COPs) IR (Environmental) стран выброс климат конференц газ
61 0.04297 Climate politics (Kyoto Protocol) IR (Environmental) протокол киотск выброс росс газ
10 0.00949 Climate research (Russian-Belarusian) IR (Environmental) союзн сред государств беларус программ
34 0.01791 IR (ASIA-APEC) IR (Non-security) япон японск стран атэс ток
83 0.04451 IR (bilateral relations) IR (Non-security) росс отношен сотрудничеств российск вопрос
64 0.03212 IR (summits) IR (Non-security) восьмерк стран саммит самм встреч
53 0.03153 Politics (EU) IR (Non-security) европейск европ евросоюз стран франц
21 0.04276 UN (and Russia) IR (Non-security) оон форум международн организац конференц
55 0.04586 IR (power politics) IR (Security) мир стран международн миров нов
94 0.02611 IR (security-conflicts) IR (Security) стран президент франц ирак израил
65 0.03344 Military (weapons, tactics) IR (Security) воен оруж ядерн сша вооружен
98 0.02428 Russian foreign policy IR (Security) украин польш стран нат европ
50 0.02846 Russian national security IR (Security) росс российск путин москв отношен
67 0.01529 Russian national security policy IR (Security) безопасн российск федерац национальн обеспечен
14 0.04719 Junk Junk стат дан глобальн опубликова the
18 0.11096 Junk Junk росс стран российск наш вопрос
37 0.04236 Junk Junk весн апрел март месяц нов
38 0.16944 Junk Junk перв нов стал последн сам
44 0.02054 Junk Junk фильм режиссер фестивал кин театр
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72 0.10996 Junk Junk говор вопрос наш дума как
80 0.14946 Junk Junk дел сам одн так люб
81 0.18603 Junk Junk вопрос мнен решен счита сторон
85 0.05983 Junk Junk глобальн дел потеплен никак говор
92 0.03711 Junk Junk сообща город летн женщин сообщ
56 0.02579 Gardening NA растен вин дерев сорт гриб
77 0.04576 Relationship/feelings NA женщин жизн друг люб люд
16 0.08431 Trivia NA дом рук сво голов мест
32 0.01479 TV announcements NA программ кана телевиден зрител канал
12 0.02011 Antarctic Polar science антарктид озер антарктическ учен антарктик
89 0.0198 Arctic (science) Polar science экспедиц северн арктик полярн полюс
87 0.0064 Environmental protection (Air pollution) Pollution воздух атмосферн вредн выброс веществ
57 0.05049 Environmental protection (General pollution) Pollution экологическ сред окружа эколог природ
79 0.04054 Moscow Russian cities город москв московск столиц городск
9 0.00408 Medvedev’s politics (Russian politics) Russian politics наш росс стран нов политическ
13 0.04664 Politics (Russian officials meet) Russian politics росс правительств заседан председател совет
51 0.07288 Russian diplomacy Russian politics президент росс российск путин медвед
2 0.00542 Russian legislation Russian politics пункт услуг работ налогов товар
40 0.00909 Russian mitigation legislature Russian politics российск федерац федеральн рубл тыс
91 0.00222 Russian politics (Ministries/docs) Russian politics росс программ государствен заказчик год
71 0.05431 Russian science Science (other) наук научн учен институт исследован
96 0.02807 Scientific discoveries (Genetics) Science (other) учен исследован ген мозг организм
11 0.03126 Art (Film/music industry) Society and culture групп сша концерт сам музык
25 0.03048 Art (Music) Society and culture александр владимир росс никола петербург
63 0.01657 Fashion Society and culture одежд бел мод нос кож
3 0.03082 Historical mysteries Society and culture древн земл мест остров город
7 0.03976 Justice (Crime) Society and culture суд дел закон прав сотрудник
75 0.018 Literature Society and culture книг русск писател автор рома
88 0.01814 Nobel Prize Society and culture прем нобелевск гор лауреат наград
43 0.03377 Philosophy Society and culture человечеств человек век природ земл
76 0.04062 Politics and Society Society and culture обществ социальн власт прав стран
46 0.08575 Population growth Society and culture стран рост населен миров мир
74 0.02317 Religion Society and culture русск век культур храм церкв
97 0.01731 Sport Society and culture олимпийск спорт соч игр команд
70 0.02096 USSR Society and culture советск ссср народ войн союз
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Appendix C. Statistical analysis1101
Appendix C.1. Newspapers included in the analysis1102
Table C.5: Ownership, Interests and Ideology of 23 Prominent Russian Newspapers
Newspaper Year Ownership Interests & Ideology
Owner (Name) Owner (Type) Energy Kremlin Ideology
Argumenty i fakty 1995 Unknown Journalists No No Center
Argumenty i fakty 2002 Promsvyaz’kapital Business No Yes Center
Argumenty i fakty 2014 Moscow City Government State-owned No No Center
Argumenty nedeli 2011 SVR-Media, SWR group Journalists No Yes Center
E’konomika i zhizn’ 1995 Independent Journalists No Yes Center
E’kspert 1998 Unknown Journalists No No Right
E’kspert 2000 Unknown Journalists No Yes Right
E’kspert 2007 Oleg Deribaska, Expert Media Holding Business Yes Yes Right
Itogi 1997 Media Most, Gusinskiy Business No No Right
Itogi 2001 Gazprom Media Holding Business Yes Yes Right
Izvestiia 1995 Journalists collective Journalists No No Right
Izvestiia 1997 Lukoil, Oneksimnabk Business Yes Yes Right
Izvestiia 2005 Gazprom Business Yes Yes Right
Izvestiia 2008 National Media Group Business Yes Yes Right
Kommersant. Daily 1995 Vladimiri Yakovlev Journalists No No Right
Kommersant. Daily 1999 Berezovkiy & Basri Badartsikashvili Business No No Right
Kommersant. Daily 2007 Alisher Usmanov Business Yes No Right
Kommersant. Den’gi 1995 Vladimiri Yakovlev Journalists No No Right
Kommersant. Den’gi 1999 Berezovkiy & Basri Badartsikashvili Business No No Right
Kommersant. Den’gi 2007 Alisher Usmanov Business Yes No Right
Komsomol’skaia pravda 1997 Profmedia; Swedish group A-Pressen Business Yes Yes Right
Komsomol’skaia pravda 2007 Grigorii Berezkin, energy sector Business Yes Yes Center
Literaturnaia gazeta 1995 Independent Journalists No Yes Center
Moskovskaia pravda 1995 Muladjanov Shod, Editorial board Journalists No No Center
Moskovskii’ komsomolets 1995 Pavel Gusev Journalists No Yes Right
Nasha versiia 2000 Soversheno Sekretno Journalists No No Center
Nasha versiia 2007 Nikolai Zyatkov Journalists No Yes Center
Novaia gazeta 1995 Editorial Board; Aleksander Lebedev (39pc); Journalists Yes No Right
Mikhail Gorbachyov (10pc)
Novye izvestiia 1998 Alliance Oil Company, Berezovskiy Business Yes No Right
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Novye izvestiia 2003 Alliance Oil Company Business Yes Yes Center
Ogonek 1999 Berezovkiy Business Yes No Center
Ogonek 2003 Russian Media Ventures Journalists No No Center
Ogonek 2005 Telekominvest Business No No Center
Ogonek 2009 Alisher Usmanov Business Yes Yes Center
Pravda 1995 Communist party of the RF Political Party No No Far-left
Profil’ 1995 Sergei Rodionov Business No No Right
Rossii’skaia gazeta 1995 Russian government State-owned Yes No Center
Sovetskaia Rossiia 1995 Independent Journalists No No Far-left
Trud 1995 Journalists Journalists No No Left
Trud 1998 Gazprom Business Yes No Left
Trud 2003 PromSvyazCapital Business No No Left
Trud 2012 Institute of Free Journalism Journalists No No Left
(Sergei Tsoi, Valery Simonov, Yuri Ryazhsky)
Uchitel’skaia gazeta 1995 Independent Journalists No No Center
Vecherniaia Moskva 1995 Bank of Moscow Business No Yes Center
Vecherniaia Moskva 2011 Moscow government State-owned No No Center
Zavtra 1995 Prokhanov/Babakov (UR) Political Party No No Far-right
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Appendix C.2. Dependent variables1104
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Figure C.5: Temporal variation of dependent variables. The proportion of all words
devoted to the meta-topics that underlie a given dependent variable. Quarterly data
from the 23 most prominent Russian newspapers over the period Q1/2000-Q2/2014
are displayed. A local polynomial line (orange) is displayed to aid interpretation. Note
that y-axes are not on a common scale.
Appendix C.3. Statistical model1105
As briefly outlined in Section 4.3, we estimate variation in the intensity of1106
news coverage employing a mixture of a Bernoulli distribution for the decision1107
to cover the issue at all and a beta distribution to represent coverage intensity.1108
Suppose yit represents coverage for paper i during time period t. We assume1109
the following probability model:1110
BernBeta(yit|p, µ, φ) =
{
p if yit = 0
(1− p)Beta(µ, φ) if yit > 0 (C.1)
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Note that p is the probability of not covering climate change in a particular1112
period and the Beta distribution is expressed in terms of its mean (µ) and1113
precision (φ) parameters:1114
Beta(µ, φ) =
Γ(φ)
Γ(µφ)Γ((1− µ)φ)y
µφ−1(1− y)(1−µ)φ−1 (C.2)
1115
where 0 ≥ µ ≤ 1, φ > 0, and Γ is the gamma function. We follow the literature1116
and parametrize µ = αα+β and φ = α+β, where α and β are the shape parameters1117
for the Beta distribution. We link the covariates described in Table 2 to pit and1118
µ using the logit link function.1119
Given that 1) the zero-inflated Beta model is a somewhat non-standard spec-1120
ification in the literature and 2) our data require the inclusion of random effects1121
for repeated measures, we employ Bayesian inference. Specifically, we estimate1122
the following model:1123
yit ∼ BernBeta(pit, µit, φit) (likelihood)
logit(pit) = βz=0X + αpaper + αtime
logit(µit) = βz=1X + αpaper + αtime
φ ∼ U(0, 1) (priors)
β ∼ N(0, 5)
αpapers ∼ N(µpapers, σpapers)
αtime ∼ N(µtime, σtime)
µpapers ∼ N(0, 1)
µtime ∼ N(0, 1)
σpapers ∼ HalfStudentT (3, 0, 10)
σtime ∼ HalfStudentT (3, 0, 10)
We thus assume diffuse priors throughout the model—yet the results are stable1124
to alternative assumptions regarding prior specification. All of our models are1125
estimated via MCMC using the No-U-Turn Sampler (NUTS) implemented in1126
Stan (http://mc-stan.org).1127
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